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RELIGION, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE
COMMODIFICATION OF HUMAN BODY PARTS
William E. Stempsey *
INTRODUCTION
Many people who think about issues in biomedical ethics are deeply
religious, and their religious faith rightly influences their thought.
Nonetheless, simply identifying oneself as religious tells us nothing
about how one thinks about the commodification of body parts. Re-
ligious and moral views about this topic are intertwined in a complex
and controversial way. This Article is a philosophical analysis of the
way religions and people in general have thought about the issue of
commodifying body parts and about the human body.
Provided there are proper guidelines, and accepting the biomedical-
industrial complex the way it exists-a morally questionable accept-
ance-there may be a reasonable way to give moral approbation to a
few forms of commodification. Here, however, I want to focus only
on proposals to create a market involving living vendors of organs. I
recognize that most advocates of commodifying organs for transplan-
tation do not argue for an outright free-market system; rather, they
favor such things as tax credits and payment for funeral expenses.
Nevertheless, as we will see, a free market in organs is discussed and
promoted as a viable option even by some professing religious faith.
I have published both utilitarian and deontological arguments ex-
plaining why we should not allow an organ market.1 In this Article, I
will take a somewhat different tack, situating my opposition to a mar-
ket in a phenomenological view of the human body. First, I will out-
line the problem as I see it. Then, I will briefly consider how a few
religious traditions have looked at the problem, focusing especially on
the Roman Catholic tradition. I will conclude by suggesting that pro-
ponents of organ markets and property rights for body parts root their
thinking in a philosophy of the body that depends on a questionable
* William E. Stempsey, S.J., M.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor of Philosophy, College of the
Holy Cross, One College Street, Worcester, MA 01610; (508) 793-2469;
wstempsey@holycross.edu.
1. See William E. Stempsey, Paying People to Give Up Their Organs: The Problem With Corn-
modification of Body Parts, 10 MED. HUMAN. REV. 45 (1996); William E. Stempsey, Organ Mar-
kets and Human Dignity: On Selling Your Body and Soul, 6 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 195 (2000).
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Cartesian dualism. My argument here is that a phenomenological ap-
proach to the philosophy of the body better fits the question and tells
against an organ market. Furthermore, it sheds light on the persistent
reluctance of people to donate organs.
II. PROPOSALS FOR ORGAN MARKETS
Although organ markets are prohibited by law in the United
States, 2 they are proposed by some as the best solution to the shortage
in transplantable organs. Many years of appeals for organ donations
and attempts to educate the public have failed to increase the supply
of transplantable organs. Other strategies that have been suggested
include "presumed consent," "opting out," and even "conscription" of
organs at death, 3 but all are criticized for giving insufficient attention
to the wishes of individuals, at least thirty percent of whom, according
to polls, would not agree to donate an organ. 4
Julia Mahoney argued that markets in human tissue already exist
and cannot be stopped; avoiding market and property concepts in
transplantation will not eliminate the pursuit of financial rewards for
transactions in human tissue, but will only obscure them and make
critique of the system more difficult.5 She gave four examples. 6 First,
current solid organ transplantation practice generates considerable
amounts of money in "acquisition fees" paid both by transplanting
hospitals to organ procurement organizations and by patients and in-
surers to the transplanting hospitals and physicians. 7 Second, corneas
removed under "presumed consent" laws are sold by coroners' offices
to tissue banks.8 Third, young women are paid for their "time and
trouble" in harvesting their "donor eggs," and women having trouble
getting pregnant pay significant amounts of money for the implanta-
tion of these ova.9 Finally, various tissues considered to be "waste"
are acquired by the biotechnology industry and used to generate con-
siderable profit.10 Mahoney argued that the fact that human organs
2. National Organ Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e(2) (1994).
3. See, e.g., Arthur L. Caplan, Organ Transplants: The Cost of Success, An Argument for Pre-
sumed Consent and Oversight, 13 HASTINGS CTR. REP. 23 (1983); Aaron Spital & Charles A.
Erin, Conscription of Cadaveric Organs for Transplantation: Let's at Least Talk About It, 39 AM.
J. KIDNEY DISEASES 611 (2002).
4. R. M. Veatch & J. B. Pitt, The Myth of Presumed Consent: Ethical Problems in New Organ
Procurement Strategies, 27 TRANSPLANTATION PROC. 1888, 1889-90 (1995).
5. Julia D. Mahoney, The Market for Human Tissue, 86 VA. L. REV. 163, 173, 207 (2000).
6. Id. at 173.
7. Id. at 180.
8. Id. at 183-84.
9. Id. at 185-87.
10. Id. at 189-91.
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are considered to be "priceless" does not tell against a possible legiti-
mate market in organs because other "priceless" and nonfungible
commodities, such as "artworks . . . and other things [having] non-
economic worth to their holders," are traded in free market systems
without controversy. 1 Furthermore, the existing organ market can
bring considerable profit to many, but the "donors" of the tissue are
systematically excluded from the profits.'2
This problem led Robert Veatch to reconsider his position against
payment for organ procurement. 13 He reasonably believes that the
real moral concern in such a market is manipulation of the neediest.
Because the government for twenty years has consistently refused to
provide basic necessities for the poorest even though it has the capa-
bility to do so, Veatch, with great reluctance, argued that we should
stop opposing an organ market and allow the poor to sell organs if
that is the only way they have to better their lot.' 4 But he stopped far
short of an endorsement of the practice. Veatch said that it is with
"shame and some bitterness" that he recommends ending our prohibi-
tion of an organ market and tolerating financial incentives as "a lesser
moral evil.' 15
It is clear that in the realm of biotechnology there are justice issues
that need to be fixed, but I am not ready to concede that commodify-
ing body parts for pragmatic, legal, or political reasons is a good solu-
tion. A more radical overhaul of the encroaching market in medicine
is called for, but I realize, as most others do, that this is a massive and
perhaps unachievable goal in the American political context. None-
theless, extending the market as a solution to help those hurt by a
market already run amok seems like the wrong solution.
While some market advocates are free-market libertarians who ar-
gue that we ought to be able to do what we wish with our bodies,' 6
others present more sophisticated proposals that attempt to be more
ethically palatable. Gregory Boyd, for instance, pointed to the 1994
Pennsylvania law that provides money, collected from voluntary dona-
tions, to help pay "reasonable hospital and other medical expenses,
funeral expenses and incidental expenses incurred by the donor or do-
ll. Mahoney, supra note 5 at 207.
12. Id. at 163.
13. Robert M. Veatch, Why Liberals Should Accept Financial Incentives for Organ Procure-
ment, 13 KENNEDY INST. ETHics J. 19, 32 (2003).
14. Id. at 31-32.
15. Id. at 32.
16. See, for instance, the argument presented in H. TRISTRAM ENGELHARDT, JR., THE FOUN-
DATIONS OF BIOETHIcs 58 (2d ed. 1996).
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nor's family in connection with making a vital organ donation.' 7 The
money goes directly to the organization that provides services to the
donor-hospitals, funeral homes, hotels, or other appropriate entities;
no money is given directly to the donor or the "donor's family, next of
kin or estate."'1 8 Gregory Crespi proposed a futures market for or-
gans. 19 This market would ban all sales by living people, but would
allow individuals to sell the rights to their organs to some buyer.20
The buyer would then have the option, but not the obligation, to har-
vest the seller's organs after the seller's death. 21 The organs would be
removed for transplantation or other purposes only after the seller
had died.22 Payments would be made only to the seller's estate.23
Such proposals are reasonable in that they attempt to avoid the
kind of manipulation of poor organ sellers that is such a concern in an
outright organ market. They attempt to increase the supply of trans-
plantable organs by offering financial incentives that will not accrue to
the individual whose organs are procured. It is, of course, an empiri-
cal question whether such methods will actually increase the supply of
organs, and it would be worth doing studies replicating the situation in
Pennsylvania.
I have my doubts about the effectiveness of such practices to in-
crease the organ supply, however, because I do not believe that such
financial incentives will be enough to counteract other strong disin-
centives to donate organs. Specifically, the problem of organ dona-
tion is inextricably linked with concerns about death and dissection of
the body. There is deep confusion about the meaning and definition
of death in the current technological culture. People, even physicians,
sometimes talk about keeping brain dead people alive. In 1989, a
team of researchers surveyed 195 physicians and nurses who were
likely to be involved in declaring death and procuring organs for
transplantation. 24 Only thirty-five percent of those surveyed were
able to give "the [correct] whole-brain criterion of death and [cor-
17. S. Gregory Boyd, Considering a Market in Human Organs, 4 N.C. J.L. & TECH. 417, 459
(2003) (quoting 20 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 8622(b)(1)).
18. Id.
19. Gregory S. Crespi, Overcoming the Legal Obstacles to the Creation of a Futures Market in
Bodily Organs, 55 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 35 (1994).
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. Stuart J. Youngner et al., 'Brain Death' and Organ Retrieval: A Cross-Sectional Survey of
Knowledge and Concepts Among Health Professionals, 261 JAMA 2205, 2206 (1989).
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rectly] apply it" to a case.2 5 Physicians in decisionmaking roles did
significantly better than other professionals, with nearly two-thirds an-
swering correctly.2 6 Nonetheless, there is a substantial amount of con-
fusion over brain death even among health professionals. The study
also found that health professionals were uneasy about making deci-
sions about brain death and in talking with families about organ dona-
tion.2 7 The investigators concluded that "[t]he confusion of many
physicians and nurses about criteria and concepts of death . . . may
well contribute to this discomfort with, and resistance to, pursuing or-
gan donation. '28
The general public seems to remain at least as confused as the
health professionals, and such confusion probably has an effect on the
general reluctance of many to consider donating organs. Such deep-
seated ambivalence is unlikely, in my estimation, to be overcome by
the kinds of financial incentives being proposed. I will say more about
the importance of this type of lived experience when I consider the
phenomenology of the body later in this Article. A market for living
donors might be a more effective incentive, but it is far more ethically
problematic.
III. RELIGIOUS TEACHINGS
Many religious bodies have established views about organ donation
in general; these are based on particular understandings of both
human death and human embodiment. Religious teachings on organ
markets are less explicit. Although Islam is not monolithic in its
teaching, it provides one clear rejection of commerce in organs. An
international conference of Islamic jurists in 1988 "rejected any traf-
ficking or trading in human organs" and recommended focusing on
altruism in organ transplantation. 29
Jewish authorities have refused to say that organ sales are abso-
lutely forbidden. Nonetheless, under Jewish standards, the ethical sta-
tus of an organ market ultimately depends on solving some specific
pragmatic problems. A central issue is that any acceptable system
would have to ensure that potential buyers and sellers both give
25. Id. at 2208. The "whole-brain criterion" of death is "irreversible loss of all brain func-
tion." Id. at 2205.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2209.
28. Id.
29. Abdallah S. Daar, Islam, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANSPLANTATION 29,
32 (Jeremy R. Chapman et al. eds., 1997).
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proper informed consent and that sellers are not exploited.30 Without
such a system, an organ market "remain[s] [only] a theoretical
possibility. '31
As might be expected, Protestant Christians leave much to individ-
ual interpretation and decision; we are left largely with arguments
from individual theologians who hold varied opinions. Paul Ramsey,
for example, found the idea of an organ market repulsive because it
would "erode still more" our appreciation of the sacredness of the
human in the order of biological creation. 32 John Habgood stated that
the Church of England finds commercial transactions in human organs
unacceptable because commerce radically alters the meaning of the
transplantation, "dangerously reinforcing tendencies to interpret
human life in more and more mechanistic terms. ' 33 The body is the
"bearer of personality," and so "buying and selling of body parts, like
the buying and selling of persons, violates human dignity" and deval-
ues the person.34 On the other hand, Larry Torcello and Stephen
Wear pointed out that Protestant theology affirms the ability of the
individuals to interpret theological matters in light of their own reflec-
tion.35 They invoked the "Protestant principle of a 'godly calling"' to
argue that individuals ought to be able to make autonomous choices
to donate or sell an organ.36
Roman Catholicism presents another complicated picture. Ulti-
mately, I believe that a Catholic position should reject commerce in
organs. I would like to review some of the debate about the Catholic
tradition, however, in the hope that the debate might shed some light
on how all of us might think about commerce in human organs. Some
thinkers find support for an organ market in the Roman Catholic tra-
dition. Mark Cherry appealed to the writings of Saint Thomas Aqui-
nas-particularly the principles of totality and charity-to support an
organ market.37 He argued that these principles are consistent with a
market in human organs. Cherry saw cadaver organs as "no longer
caught up in the life and good of the human person" and "much like
30. Richard V. Grazi & Joel B. Wolowelsky, Nonaltruistic Kidney Donations in Contemporary
Jewish Law and Ethics, 75 TRANSPLANTATION 250, 250 (2003).
31. Id.
32. PAUL RAMSEY, THE PATIENT AS PERSON: EXPLORATIONS IN MEDICAL ETHICS 209 (1970).
33. John Habgood, The Church of England, in ORGAN AND TISSUE DONATION FOR TRANS-
PLANTATION, supra note 29, at 25.
34. Id. at 25-26.
35. Larry Torcello & Stephen Wear, The Commercialization of Human Body Parts: A Reap-
praisal From a Protestant Perspective, 6 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 153 (2000).
36. Id. at 167.
37. Mark J. Cherry, Body Parts and the Market Place: Insights From Thomistic Philosophy, 6
CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 171 (2000).
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other types of things."' 38 Even living persons, however, might be justi-
fied in selling redundant organs, provided there is a "morally compel-
ling charitable reason," such as the need to buy medicine or other
such life essentials for their family. 39 Nicholas Capaldi argued that
"[f]rom a Catholic perspective, the ideal public policy would be one in
which everyone voluntarily donated their organs [at death,] especially
to private medical-charitable agencies" that affirm the "divine origin
of life."'40 The second best alternative would consist of a system of tax
credits for those who donate organs.41 He doubts, however, that such
policies would be successful in providing an adequate number of or-
gans. Finally, Capaldi offered a third possibility-a "prudential" pol-
icy involving a private market in which "a quasi-charitable Catholic
transplantation agency can help to render the process sacred by treat-
ing the organ in the right spirit despite the intentions of the original or
even intermediate sellers."'42
The question is whether such proposals are truly consistent with
Roman Catholic teaching. Capaldi and Cherry both referred to the
1956 address of Pope Pius XII to a group of ophthalmologists in which
the Pope approved of transplanting cadaver corneas. In the address,
the Pope admitted that "grave abuses could occur if a payment is de-
manded" but that "it would be going too far to declare immoral every
acceptance or every demand of payment. ' 43 He referred to the prac-
tice of selling blood for transfusion, which would have been quite
common at the time.44 This statement, however, is far from advocat-
ing an organ market. It is not at all clear where to draw the line be-
tween sales that lead to grave abuses and sales that might in some
circumstances be permitted. In any case, this statement of Pope Pius
XII in the very early days of organ transplantation should be read in
conjunction with a 1984 allocution of Pope John Paul II to an organi-
zation of blood and organ donors. This statement emphasizes dona-
tion, generosity, and Christian solidarity without mentioning the
38. Id. at 187.
39. Id.
40. Nicholas Capaldi, A Catholic Perspective on Organ Sales, 6 CHRISTIAN BIOETHICS 139
(2000).
41. Id. at 144-45.
42. Id. at 145.
43. Pope Pius XII, Tissue Transplantation, in THE HUMAN BODY: PAPAL TEACHINGS 373,
381-82 (Monks of Solesmes eds., 1960).
44. Id. at 382.
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possibility of organ sales.45 Pope John Paul II could have affirmed
Pope Pius XII's apparent approval of some organ sales, but he did not.
It is important to recognize, however, that papal allocutions of these
types are not to be taken as legislative in nature,46 and so neither of
these proclamations should be seen as a definitive statement about an
organ market. On the other hand, the Ethical and Religious Directives
for Catholic Health Care Services of the National Conference of Cath-
olic Bishops should be recognized as the most comprehensive and au-
thoritative statement on American Catholic healthcare practices. 47
The current 2001 version follows the 1985 revision; Directive 30 states
that organs may be procured from living donors as long as no "essen-
tial bodily function of the donor" will be sacrificed and as long as the
"anticipated benefit to the recipient is proportionate to the harm done
to the donor. ' '48 The directive then explicitly rules out an organ mar-
ket: "[E]conomic advantages should not accrue to the donor. ' 49 This
explicit prohibition of organ sales is an addition to the 1985 revision of
the directives; the original 1975 edition made no mention of economic
issues in its treatment of organ donation. Hence, while scholarly theo-
logical debate may continue about the merits of an organ market, and
while there may not be a definitive universal Catholic teaching on or-
gan markets, the teaching of the American bishops is quite clear and
unambiguous-an organ donor is not to receive an economic advan-
tage as a result of the organ donation.
IV. PHILOSOPHY OF THE BODY
I want to take a more philosophical turn now. The Catholic Church
has never endorsed any particular philosophical system. Although
Thomism, ultimately rooted in Aristotle, has certainly played a central
role for hundreds of years, neo-Platonism continues to show its mark
on the most fundamental Christian doctrines. In every age, theolo-
gians turn to the best philosophical thought available, using it to illu-
minate matters of faith. In this spirit, I want to turn to a philosophical
investigation of the human body. I believe that this will serve us well
45. Pope John Paul II, Blood and Organ Donors, Address Before Participants in a Solidarity
March Sponsored by the Italian Association of Voluntary Donors of Blood and Organs (Aug. 2,
1984), in 30 THE POPE SPEAKS 1 (1985).
46. Francis G. Morrisey, Papal and Curial Pronouncements: Their Canonical Significance in
Light of the 1983 Code of Canon Law, 50 JURIST 102, 102 (1990).
47. U.S. CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, ETHICAL AND RELIGIOUS DIRECTIVES FOR
CATHOLIC HEALTH CARE SERVICES (4th ed. 2001), available at http://www.usccb.org/bishops/
directives.shtml.
48. Id.
49. Id.
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in bringing to greater awareness our own buried presuppositions
about the nature of humans and their organs. I hope that it will also
shed light on just what should and should not be for sale.
Proponents of an overt market in human organs usually assert that
people have a property right to their organs.50 Classifying human
bodies and body parts as "quasi-property" has a long legal tradition. 51
This might be the best legal strategy we have for protecting important
interests, but we should note that this strategy arose from the interest
of individuals in disposing of their remains and directing their families
to look after the task after their death. These property rights view the
body not as property to be traded, but rather as a cherished former
person's remains, which must be properly interred so as not to turn
into a horror. If the body is property, it is far different from property
such as land, houses, and furniture.
Thomas Murray rightly pointed out that money and markets are the
dominant way of distributing goods in America, but he argued that
"there are many goods that money should not be able to buy"-legal
verdicts, Pulitzer Prizes, and children are a few that he named.52 Mur-
ray argued that tyranny, in Pascal's sense of desiring powers outside
one's own sphere, reigns when human organs are converted into
money.53 Properly placing the line between one's own sphere and
what lies outside is admittedly difficult, yet we do draw such lines. We
admire those who are paid for using their bodies for a hard day's
work, but we frown on those who are paid for using their bodies in
prostitution. It takes wisdom to draw such lines.54
My philosophical concerns, though, take us even deeper into a
shadowy and contentious place-the philosophy of mind. I believe
that seeing organs as property is rooted in an unquestioned presuppo-
sition of a problematic philosophical position on the relation of body
and mind. The problem, going back at least to Plato, but definitively
set up in the first part of the seventeenth century by Ren6 Descartes,
is that of mind-body dualism. When you claim a property right to
your kidneys, just exactly who is the "you" that owns the kidneys?
Descartes famously claimed that the essence of the human being is the
50. See, e.g., Crespi, supra note 19.
51. See id. at 65-66 nn. 276-85.
52. Thomas H. Murray, Organ Vendors, Families, and the Gift of Life, in ORGAN TRANSPLAN-
TATION: MEANINGS AND REALITIES 101 (Stuart J. Youngner et al. eds., 1996).
53. Id.
54. For a discussion of wisdom in medical decisionmaking, drawing from the philosophy of the
ancient Stoics, see William E. Stempsey, A New Stoic: The Wise Patient, 29 J. MED. & PHIL. 451
(2004).
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res cogitans: the mind, or soul-the thing that thinks.55 The body is
surely connected to this thinking substance but is not essential to the
person. The Platonic version of this dualism has influenced religious
views that see the body as a hindrance to the real spiritual progress of
the soul. Yet it was Descartes who first conceptualized the body as a
machine, a substance wholly unlike the mental substance that consti-
tutes the true essence of the person. This view has become so in-
grained in most of us that it is hardly questioned. The idea of body as
a machine has enabled contemporary technical medicine to flourish
with unprecedented empirical success.
Nonetheless, the biblical traditions, both Hebrew and Christian,
give us a quite a different picture. The Hebrew Scriptures do not pre-
sent the human person in this dualistic way. The soul is real enough-
it is what animates the body. When the soul (nephesh) leaves the
body, the person is no more. 56 While it may be proper to talk about
the spiritual or mental experience of human beings, it is the whole
human being that has these experiences. It is impossible to separate
body and soul without losing the person. In this way, the scriptures
present a philosophical view of the human person that is much more
Aristotelian than Platonic.
Christian teaching, coming somewhat later, is more influenced by
the neo-Platonism that flourished in the first centuries after Christ.
This should not be surprising, as every generation must have some
philosophical tools to express its thought about the deepest problems
of human existence. The early Christians used what they had, just as
we tend to adopt a Cartesian view, usually without even realizing it.
But the fundamental Christian teaching of the resurrection of the
body, expressed by Saint Paul in Romans,57 makes it clear that the
human person is incomplete without the body. Heaven is not to be
populated by disembodied souls that constitute our real essence.
Saint Paul, in 1 Corinthians,58 says that the body that rises will be a
"spiritual" body. Of course, no one knows exactly what this might
mean, but Saint Paul leaves no doubt that it is our particular bodies
that will be raised. Whereas the neo-Platonists took immortality as
55. REN8 DESCARTES, MEDITATIONS ON FIRST PHILOSOPHY 19 (Laurence J. Lafleur trans., 2d
ed., rev. 1960).
56. The Hebrew "nephesh" does not carry the familiar connotations of the term "soul." The
strict opposition between soul and body is more influenced by Greek and medieval philosophy.
Rather, nephesh is closely associated with life. In Genesis 2:7, God breathes the breath of life
into the nostrils of the human, who then becomes a living nephesh. See JoHNm L. MCKENZIE, S.J.,
DICTIONARY OF THE BIBLE 836 (1965).
57. 8:11.
58. 15:35-49.
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the escape of the higher soul (nous) from the body, Christians con-
ceived immortality as the restoration of the wholeness of the person,
but to a person no longer enlivened only by psyche, the Aristotelian
soul, but divinized by pneuma, or spirit.5 9 Essentially, Christians as-
sert that the human person is incomplete without the body and should
not be construed as merely a mind that is contingently in possession of
a body; the human person is a composite of body and soul.
Philosophers writing in the phenomenological tradition further illu-
minate this theological understanding of the human person. Maurice
Merleau-Ponty may have given us the best expression of a phenome-
nology of the body.60 Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology rejected the
Cartesian dichotomy between body and soul.61 For Merleau-Ponty,
the body is not just an object that can be known by a subject; rather, it
is "the experience of our own body" that "reveals to us an ambiguous
mode of existing. ' '62 He made an argument using the example of the
phantom limb, when a person who has lost an arm or leg continues to
feel its presence.63 Merleau-Ponty argued that neither physiological
nor psychological explanations adequately elucidate this phenome-
non.64 Physiological factors alone cannot explain the phenomenon,
for anesthesia does not eliminate the sensation. 65 Likewise, psycho-
logical factors cannot furnish the sole explanation because severing
the nerves to the brain does abolish the phenomenon, indicating that
physiological factors play some part in the explanation. 66
Merleau-Ponty's solution to this problem is to reject the root cause
of the dilemma-the underlying mind-body dualism-and to adopt
the perspective of the lived body. The phenomenon can only be un-
derstood in the perspective of "being-in-the-world," and the body is
the "vehicle" for being-in-the-world. 67 He wrote: "To have a phantom
arm is to remain open to all the actions of which the arm alone is
capable; it is to retain the practical field which one enjoyed before
mutilation.'"68
59. See THE NEW JERUSALEM BIBLE 1911, n.w (1985).
60. MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPTION (Colin Smith trans.,
1962).
61. Id. at 102.
62. Id. at 230.
63. Id. at 87-102.
64. Id. at 94.
65. Id. at 88.
66. MERLEAU-PONTY, supra note 60, at 88-89.
67. Id. at 94.
68. Id.
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The body is, above all, a way of viewing the world and of interacting
with everything in the world. Merleau-Ponty wrote:
Whether it is a question of another's body or my own, I have no
means of knowing the human body other than that of living it,
which means taking up on my own account the drama which is be-
ing played out in it, and losing myself in it. I am my body, at least
wholly to the extent that I possess experience, and yet at the same
time my body is as it were a "natural" subject, a provisional sketch
of my total being. 69
In short, it is a mistake to think of the body as a machine as did
Descartes. Our essence is not the subjective cogito, lying in opposi-
tion to the objective body. Rather, the body is essentially what we are
and what enables our experience of the world.
Other contemporary philosophers continue in this vein. S. Kay
Toombs expounded upon Edmund Husserl's distinction between the
"lived body" of our experience and other sorts of physical and ani-
mate bodies. She argued that although the body may be apprehended
as an object, it is distinct from other objects in the world because it is
the medium through which we apprehend the world and interact with
it.70 The body is owned, not in the sense that we own other objects,
but only in the sense that my experience tells me that my body is
mine. My body "enables me to actualize the existential projects that
constitute, and express, my personhood" 71 and "reflects the body as a
social and cultural entity. ' 72 Toombs further argued that under nor-
mal circumstances we are unaware of our bodies, but, as Sartre recog-
nized, the lived body can be apprehended as an object, especially
when it is conceived as a physiological organism, and especially when
one is well versed in sciences such as physiology and pathology.73 But,
as Toombs pointed out, to say my body is my "own" is not the same as
saying I "own" my body in the way I might own my dog. The body is
not just a "machine-like entity comprised of separate organ systems
and parts," but rather an "intentional unity" that enables our unique
experience of the world around us. 74
69. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
70. S. Kay Toombs, What Does It Mean to Be Somebody? Phenomenological Reflections and
Ethical Quandaries, in PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS
73 (Mark J. Cherry ed., 1999).
71. Id. at 78.
72. Id. at 79.
73. Id. at 82.
74. Id. at 85.
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As Drew Leder recognized, "[T]ransplantation exemplifies the par-
adigmatic bent of Cartesian science .... -75 By conceiving the body in
terms of mechanical parts, Cartesianism allows us to overcome a long-
standing hesitance at "tampering with nature" and long-standing
"taboos against cutting up the live and dead human body" in a desper-
ate fight to overcome death.76 Leder further argued that an organ
market would not be a neutral means of exchange for people seeking
whatever it is that they value (organs or money), but rather a system
that implicitly adopts a problematic Cartesian metaphysics of the body
in which organs are reduced to objects just like any other object.77
What I would argue is that Cartesianism leads us to reject the type of
experiential embodiment that phenomenological philosophers recog-
nize and, in its cold analysis, fails to account for the feelings we have
about our bodies and body parts.
An appreciation of the centrality of experience to the phenomeno-
logical viewpoint helps us to understand why a shortage of transplant-
able organs persists despite many efforts and why a market will also
fail to relieve the shortage. All these efforts fail to recognize that our
experience of our bodies is not an experience of a collection of organs
functioning as a machine. The fact that we would be repulsed if, for
example, we had a kidney removed because of cancer and then found
that kidney on public display should tell us something important. Our
organs are different from our hair, which is swept away from the bar-
bershop floor without objection. We might want to retain our hair
trimmings for some reason, of course, but in the ordinary course of
events our hair trimmings are no different from our fingernail clip-
pings, which are unwanted by-products of our living bodies. On the
other hand, there may be unusual situations when we want to rid our-
selves of a normally valued body part-as when an organ harbors a
cancer, for example. The lesson of phenomenology is that it is not the
nature of the thing itself that distinguishes what can legitimately be
bought and sold, but rather our experience of the thing. Organs such
as kidneys play essential roles in establishing the very possibility of
human experience in ways that hair and fingernails do not.
Ruth Richardson found a "fearful symmetry" between an organ
market and the practice of grave robbing in the eighteenth and nine-
teenth centuries: "In the grave-robbing era, [corpses were] quarried
75. Drew Leder, Whose Body? What Body? The Metaphysics of Organ Transplantation, in
PERSONS AND THEIR BODIES: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, RELATIONSHIPS supra note 70, at 233,
238.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 248.
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for teeth, hair, skeletons, and so on," and sold to dentists, wigmakers,
and those who made specimens for medical study.78 This is a practice
that most of us would take to be repugnant. Yet Richardson argued
that several key factors that led to the practice are the same as those
that confront organ transplantation today: (1) "increasing demand for
human tissue," (2) "shortage of donors and public resistance," (3)
"competition among users/consumers," and (4) "money values at-
tached to human tissue."' 79 Richardson rightly pointed out that fear is
at the heart of the resistance to organ donation, and that the "seman-
tic massage" in euphemisms such as "donor," "procurement," "har-
vesting," and "cadaver" seek to conceal unpalatable truths about the
realities of organ transplantation. 80 There even seems to be ongoing
semantic massage-non-heart-beating cadavers have now become
non-heart-beating donors.
Rene Fox talked about the technical and moral "routinization"
and "profanation" of organ transplantation.81 Seeing organ transplan-
tation as a commonplace event serves to mask the "wonder and
dread" that the practice evoked in the 1950s. According to Fox, this
"routinization" and "frantic search for organs" is leading transplanta-
tion down "a very slippery slope. '82
V. CONCLUSION
We would do well to reconsider the ways we have swept some of the
realities of organ transplantation below the surface in order to pro-
mote it. If we are honest, we will find some repulsion in cutting a
kidney out of one person and sewing it into another. This is not to say
that the practice ought to be stopped. Sometimes we must learn to
suppress some feelings in order to carry out necessary tasks; the work
of surgeons, for instance, requires this. Yet such suppression always
carries the danger of routinization and the loss of reverence for what
ought to be revered. A phenomenological appreciation of the body
ought to cause us to reflect on what we are doing when we turn warm,
living human parts into commodities redeemable for cold cash.
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